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THE NATURE OF MUNICIPAL LEGISLATION
By ALVIN E. EVANS*
The late Professor Freund in his book on Legislative Regula-
tion' distinguished between regulative law and declaratory law
and between governmental legislation and law legislation. If pos-
sible, it would be helpful to break the various aspects of municipal
power and regulations into further classifications. Municipal
councils frequently are said to have three kinds of powers, or
there are in general three aspects of their activities which have
been tagged as legislative, administrative and quasi-judicial.
Whether a useful but tentative description of each of these powers,
and especially whether any successful effort can be made to
identify legislative acts as such, distinguished from the other
activity, remains to be seen. Primarily, we shall be interested in
law legislation.
The present writer does not hope to state oracularly what leg-
islative acts are and to describe them in such fashion that doubts
about them can be solved by the use of any formula. Ordinances
are directed toward purposes so varied that we shall have to ask
ourselves, not abstractly, which are legislative in character, but
rather, it seems wise to try to discover for what reason a council's
act is being questioned, which is before the court for examination.
Our study so far seems to develop these types of problems: (a)
Some interested person seeks to have the ordinance subjected to a
referendum, and the question arises: Is the proposed ordinance
subject to be referred? (b) The method of legal attack upon an
ordinance may be determined by whether it is legislative in nature
or is something else. (c) The issue may be whether a permissible
delegation of legislative powers has been made. (d) A legislative
act may require for its validity a different kind of approval for its
passage from that of some other acts. (e) The questions may arise
as to the nature of appointments and salary adjustments of officers
and employes. This, in part, arises also in (d) above. (f) There
* A.B., Cotner Umversity- A.M., Umversity of Nebraska; Ph.D., J.D., Un-
versity of Michigan. Dean and Prof. of Law, St. Louis Unversity School of Law;
Dean and Professor emeritus, College of Law, Unversity of Kentucky.
' (1932), pp 18-27.
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are many specific issues such as the matter of the extension of
municipal boundaries; whether motives of councilmen may be
reviewed in some cases but not in legislative matters; whether
there is liability for failure to legislate; whether it is possible,
under what Freund calls legislative law, to lay down clear-cut tests
as to what is municipal legislation as is occasionally attempted;
and further, whether the courts in talking about legislative powers
of municipalities always or usually refer to legislative rather than
administrative acts.
I. Legislation and the Referendum
Many cities exist under statutes or charters which provide for
referenda of the acts of the councils. It is usually declared that
only legislative acts are so subject, the result being that in many
cases it is necessary to decide whether a given ordinance is legisla-
tive or on the contrary is administrative or perhaps judicial in
nature. Generally legislative acts are referrable. Emergency leg-
islation, even of the law legislation type, however, is usually not
referrable. This leads to the double inquiry- Is the act proposed
in fact an emergency and if so, is it legislative?
In Burdick v San Diego,2 a resolution for the erection of a city
jail was held not to be legislative and not subject to referendum,
though in an earlier case the selection of a site for a city hall had
been held subject to it.3 The different result was explained by the
fact that in the San Diego case there had been several earlier reso-
lutions covering the same matter, one designating the site, another
appropriating the funds and a still later one varying slightly from
the others in that it accepted aid from P W.A. The' present resolu-
tion was therefore merely procedural and did not of itself establish
a policy. We then have an implication that legislation when it is
to be tested by referendum, establishes a policy respecting the
public affairs of the municipality. So an ordinance whose object
is the extension of an oil and gas drilling zone is legislative and
referrable.
4
In Washington an ordinance which revoked a temporary per-
mit granted to a street railway company (to continue operations
84 P 2d 1064 (Cal. App. 1938).
'Hopping v. Richmond, 199 Cal. 64; 248 P 225, 48 A.L.R. 509 (1926).
'State ex rel. Hunzicker v. Pulliam, 168 Okla. 632, 27 P. 2d 417 (1934).
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after its franchise had expired) and which declared an intention
to make permanent provision in the future for city transportation,
was held not to be a legislative act subject to referendumr It
merely declared an intent to develop a policy but created no
policy So an ordinance for the sale of a bus franchise was not leg-
islative but one providing for street lighting and the determina-
tion of rates to consumers was held declaratory of a policy and
subject to referendum.7 It is assumed that the policy of making
the sale had already been initiated. In the same way, an ordinance
authorizing the purchase of a site for a crematory is administrative
and not subject to referendum. Whether or not the city should
operate a crematory had heretofore been decided presumably and
this was accordingly not a policy ordinance.
Following out the idea expressed in the San Diego case above,
it was held in Kezgley v Bank" that an ordinance which in regard
to its particular content was legislative in form, but which was a
general summing up of previous ordinances was not legislative
unless there were material departures from the original acts. An
example of departures would be the insertion of provisions for
the calling of an issue of bonds at dates which differed from those
originally provided and involved a new financial plan. Is a call
for a referendum itself referrable? It was said in Campbell v
Eugene9 that to refer a call for a referendum was an idle thing to
do and would get nowhere, and so was not referrable.
There is probably no clear guide as to what is legislative from
the point of view of the referendum, unless it may be that a leg-
islative act is one which declares a policy to be followed in city gov-
ernment. The, referendum may tangle with highly. practical mat-
ters in municipal administration in which on-the-spot judgment in
particular cases is often necessary, which if honestly made should
not be disturbed.
II. The Delegahon of Municzpal Legislative Powers
The doctrine of non-delegation of powers in American law
probably grows out of the theory of separation of powers and is
'Neils v; Seattle, 185 Wash. 269, 53 P. 2d 848 (1936).
'Seaton v. Lackey, 298 Ky. 188, 182 S.W 2d. 836 (1944).
State ex rel. Reeves v. Hllyer, 128 Oho St. 294, 198 N.E. 2 (1934).8 97 Utah 60, 89 P 2d 480 (1939).
9116 Or. 264, 240 P. 418 (1925).
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supported by the argument that there should be direct responsi-
bility on the part of legislatures for their acts. It seems clear that
separation of powers as a doctrine does not apply to municipal
affairs any more than that a republican form of government
should be adopted. There is, however, a deep-seated feeling even
in the case of municipal corporations that legislative power qua
legislative should not be delegated. This probably signifies the
other alternative that the citizens should be able to control at the
polls the ultimate policy of their legislators. This idea of close
responsibility does not so much apply to purely administrative
acts and delegation therein is a matter of practical necessity.
A brief comparison may be made at the outset between the
delegation to the municipality by the legislature and delegation
by the council to its own officers. No comprehensive study is
intended of the former and only illustrations affecting taxation
will be used.
Where a municipality is given broad powers of taxation for
local requirements, may the state thereafter create a Board of Tax
Commissioners which is to have general oversight and power to
veto some items of local expenditure and perhaps increase others?
This question has been answered both affirmatively and nega-
tively. In Indiana, such power has been sustained.10 It was argueo
by the city of Indianapolisi" that the reductions made by such a
board deprived the city of the inherent right of local self govern-
ment, a view generally now discardedi2 and that the exercise of
this power involved an exercise of both legislative and judicial
powers. Both arguments were rejected. A state it was held may
reserve a check upon the tax assessments of municipalities and
lodge supervision in a state board which is not itself a municipal
corporation nor local in its powers.
In Oregon, however, such power is positively rejected at least
for home-rule cities. In Portland v Welsch,1 3 the State Tax Super-
vising and Conservation Commission reduced in the city s budget
certain salaries and rejected an item for street widening. It was
"Dunn v. Indianapolis, 208 Ind. 630, 196 N.E. 528 (1935). See 11 IND. L.
Joun. 189 (1936).
Wimbish v. Hamilton, 47 La. Ann. 246, 16 So. 856 (1895).
' Biddeford v. Yates, 104 Me. 506, 72 A. 335 (1908).
' ,154 Or. 286, 807, 59 P 2d 228, 286 (1986). In Ardmore v. Excise Board,
155 Okla. 126, 8 P. 2d 2, 10 (1932) the court adopted the theory of the inherent
right of muicipalities to local self government.
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held that these being local items, the delegation to a state com-
mission was invalid.
The delegation by a municipality to its own officers of various
duties and powers could undoubtedly be withdrawn at will by
the council. Delegation has been the subject of much litigation
with respect to traffic, zoning, structures overlooking streets, li-
censing businesses and professions and other matters. In Appeal
of Blackstone 4 a zoning ordinance prohibited the erection of cer-
tain types of structures within a named area but provided for pos-
sible variations and assured to protestants of a right of appeal from
the decision of the building inspector to a Board of Adjustment,
provided for in the ordinance. The privilege of variation was
authorized where a literal enforcement of the ordinance would
cause undue hardship. The plaintiff in that case desired to erect
a second story to his garage but a license therefor was denied by
the inspector and the denial was sustained by the board. On
certiorari from this determination the plaintiff argued that this
delegation to the inspector and to the board was a legislative mat-
ter and was invalid because no standards to govern the city's policy
had been set up as guides. It was held, however, to be unnecessary
to control the board's discretion in this way Likewise, standards
were not required to guide an art jury which has been given
authority to approve or disapprove of the erection of structures on
or overhanging public highways.15
Other courts are more insistent that the council lay down
standards for those officials invested with the duty of executing
municipal ordinances. Thus, an ordinance giving discretionary
powers to the superintendent of buildings to declare any structure
a nuisance which is unsafe for the purpose for which it was used
from the standpoint of danger by fire and which authorizes him
to take such steps as are necessary for its abatement does not set
up adequate standards for asserting municipal policy. The council
itself must determine the conditions and the circumstances which
would create an emergency like that contemplated. 16 A simple
solution would seem to be that the superintendent should report
-438 Del. 206, 190 A. 597 (1937).
'Walnut and Qtunce Corp. v. Mills, 803 Pa. 25, 154 A. 29 (1931). (Appeal
disrmssed 284 U.S. 573, 76 L. Ed. 498 (1931).)
" Lux v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 322 Mo. 342, 15 S.W 2d 843 (1929). See also
re Wilson, 32 Minn. 145, 19 N.W 723 (1884).
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to the council such buildings as are unsafe and thereafter an ordi-
nance declaring them to be a nuisance and removable would be
in order. In another case it was held that the council cannot
merely determine that the sale of liquor is to be limited to certain
patrol districts and authorize the mayor to designate the boun-
daries of those districts. The districts must be specifically named
by the council. So in a stop-gap zoning act, the council cannot
declare that the building inspector shall temporarily determine
what parts of the city belong in either of the three kinds of dis-
tricts contemplated.' 7 These cases are illustrative of the difficulties
where legislative non-delegation is insisted upon.
In Staley v Vaughan,18 the designation of what streets should
be through-traffic streets was held to be a legislative matter not to
be delegated to the police officers. The defendant had violated an
order which had so designated a certain street and injury had re-
sulted to the plaintiff because he had expected the defendant to
stop at the stop sign. This determination, however, was held to be
an administrative matter and was proper.
Ohio, however, in a case nearly identical with the Staley case
seems to hold that not only must the city provide by ordinance for
through streets, but must also name the streets.19 Thus a degree of
inflexibility is created which may not comport with public con-
venience. It would be clear a fortiori, then that an ordinance
granting to a railway station master the power to determine what
persons may park in front of the station, would be invalid not
necessarily because the power would be legislative, but because
the city could not confer authority to enforce police regulations
upon one having no connection with the police force.
2 0
The requirements of those courts which insist upon elaborate
standards to be laid down by the council create serious practical
difficulties in traffic control. In a note in his case book on Muni-
cipal Corporations,2 1 Dean Stason comments upon this problem.
He points out in his discussion of Shreveport v Herndon 2 that a
17See State ex rel. Sngley v. Woolworth, 169 N.E. 713 (Oh. App. 1929).
1'92Colo. 6, 17 P 2d 299 (1932).
" Albrecht Grocery Co. v. Overfield, 168 N.E. 386 '(Oh. App. 1929).
- Cincinnati v. Cook, 107 Oh. St. 223, 140 N.E. 655 (1929).
2nd Ed. 1946, p. 115.
'150 La. 113, 105 So. 244 (1925). (Holding m general that ordinances grant-
mg the cominussioner of public safety power to prescribe and enforce parking
rules within areas and at periods designated by hnnself are invalid.)
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strict enforcement of such a ruling makes the handling of traffic
almost impossible even in small cities. He observes that there is
now a tendency to describe such powers granted to police officers
as discretionary powers rather than legislative. Thus, in Chicago
an ordinance providing that officers are authorized to direct traffic
"in accordance with this ordinance or in emergencies as public
safety may require", was sustained.23 In that case a policeman was
directing traffic at a busy intersection. He directed a motorist
either to drive straight ahead or make a left turn. The latter re-
fused to obey and insisted upon making a right turn. After caus-
ing a traffic block he was arrested, tried and convicted for dis-
obedience of this order and his conviction was sustained. Much,
accordingly, appears in the magic of the word "administrative"
when substituted for the word "legislative"
It thus appears that it is practically impossible to set up stand-
ards of policy in emergencies and an officer must in such cases ex-
ercise his own discretion.24 Quick changes in parking rules often
become necessary and all that should be required of the ordinance
is that broad, general regulations be made for parking and traffic.
Dean Stason thinks it would help if the more specific regulations
were made by resolution rather than by ordinance. He has in
mind, doubtless, the comparative informality and simplicity in the
adoption of an ordinance for it could be hurried through. The
present writer, however, would be more liberal in the extension
of discretionary powers to police officers and would not require
even a resolution. There is no immutable law requiring a close
distinction between legislative and administrative functions in
local government, and it will serve good government not to re-
quire standards of policy to be sharply defined.
Many problems of local government have been held to involve
discretionary rather than legislative regulation. Thus, the power
of making appointments to office may be delegated to the mayor
since this power is not legislative.25 The fixing of a date for the
holding of an election has been regarded as not of such a legislative
character as to prevent the delegation of it to a special board.20
" Cucago v. Marnotto, 322 IIl. 44, 163 N.E. 369, 60 A.L.R. 501 (1928).
Cleveland v. Gustafson, 124 Oh. St. 607, 180 N.E. 59, 79 A.L.R. 1325
(1932).
29 Clark v. State St. Trust Co., 270 Mass. 140, 169 N.E. 897 (1930).
'People v. Hoze, 55 Cal. '612 (1880).
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Assuming the power in a council to subscribe for railroad stock
exists, the actual subscribing may be delegated. 27 A statutory pro-
vision even that such a subscription shall not be made without the
consent of the electors is not a wrongful legislative delegation;
28
nor the conferring upon the county judge authority to determine
whether his chief clerk may act as purchasing agent for the
countyY9 An example of non-delegable function may be found in
Seignious v Rzce 30 which may be justifiable as a matter of policy.
An ordinance divided master plumbers into two classes. One class
which consisted of those who had obtained their licenses before
1920 was relieved of the obligation to take a reexamination. It
was left to the discretion of the Health Commissioner, however, to
decide which of those licensed after 1920 should be re-examined.
The court held that this power of selection was legislative and so
not delegable. The levying of taxes and the determination of tax
rates for the purpose of fixing salaries of officials and providing
for city improvements is legislative.31 Delegation here would
scarcely be appropriate. The Kentucky court once declared that
much of the activity of councilmen was administrative, mention-
ing in particular the acceptance of bonds, the granting and revok-
ing of licenses, contracts for improvements and the acceptance of
the completed work.
3 2
III. The Nature of Appointments and of Salary Adjustments
For the present purpose, the principal interest in appointments
arises from the matter of the reconsideration of them when made.
A single illustration of the problem will suffice. In De Woody v
' Cincinnati, etc., Ry. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77 (1852).
-Paterson v. Society, 24 NJ.L. 385 (1854). See also Lux v. Milwaukee Ins.
Co., 322 Mo. 342, 15 S.W 2d 343 (1929). (A provision m a statute that a
mumcipal charter shall not take effect until approved by the electors is a mere
acceptance and not a delegation.)
State ex rel. Llewellyn v. Knox, 165 Tenn. 319, 521 S.W 2d 973 (1932).
273 N.Y. 44, 6 N.E. 2d 91 (1936).
'Cincinnati, etc., Ry. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77 (1852); Portland v.
Welch, 154 Or. 286, 307, 59 P. 2d 228, 236 (1936).
'Reuter v. Meacham Contracting Co., 143 Ky. 537, 136 S.W 1028 (1911).
(There may be danger m such an abstract dictum when a specific application is
to be made. It may be necessary to ask m what connection the question before
the court arises. The court further said: "None of these things may be done by
a purely legislative body like the legislature of a state ..... ); Wimbish v. Hamilton,
47 La. Ann. 246, 16 So. 856 (1895). See, for an enumeration of the non-legislative
functions of a state legislature, GAEmm, POLITCAL SCmNCE AND GovmouvrmT
(1935).
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Underwood3 3 the petitioner had been named by the mayor to the
civil service commission and the appointment had been confirmed
by the council. He had accordingly been notified of the confirma-
tion and had accepted by letter. At the next session of the council
the confirmation was rescinded. The rules of the council provided
that any action taken by the council may be reconsidered at the
next regular meeting on motion of a councilman who had voted
with the prevailing side. The petitioner claiming that the recon-
sideration was invalid, sought a declaratory judgment to that ef-
fect. This precise situation was not provided for in the rules of
procedure. The court held that where a collective body authorized
to make an appointment is a legislative body, the act of appoint-
ment is intrinsically administrative or executive rather than legis-
lative and that such a body has the power to reconsider. It seems,
however, that after notification of the appointment and an ac-
ceptance of it, all the conditions are performed which makes the
act final and makes reconsideration impossible.34 Thorne v
Squzer35 appears to be in square conflict with the DeWoody case,
unless it can be distinguished by the rules of procedure adopted by
the council. The Thorne case seems to the writer to reach a
wholly undesirable result.
Are salary adjustments legislative or are they administrative
acts? A conclusive answer probably cannot be made. In one case30
an officer s salary was reduced during the depression by the coun-
cil. The city at this time had adopted the city manager form of
government. In theory at least, all things of an administrative
character must first come before the manager who then makes a
recommendation to the council on the matter at hand. The plain-
tiff argued that salary adjustments being administrative must be
made only on the recommendation of the manager and in his
case this had not been done. The court held that salary adjust-
- 34 N.E. 2d 263 (Oh. App. 1940).
3'See U.S. v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 76 L. Ed 954 (1922). (When the senate
confirms a nomination (Chairman of the Fed. Pow. Com.) and on the same day
the President notifies the nominee and the latter accepts and takes the oath and
enters upon his duties the appointment is completed and a reconsideration comes
too late. Other illustrations may be found in 4 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS (1949) See. 13.50. See also Secs. 13.48 and 18.49 and 89 A.L.R.
135-136).
'264 Mich. 98, 249 N.W 497 (1933).
uWebb v. Beloit, 229 Wis. 51, 281 -N.W 662 (1938), 38 Micr. L. R. 261
(1940).
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ments were legislative 37 and the purpose of the adoption of the
city manager act was to make the manager an administrative of-
ficer. The reason that the act was legislative was said to be be-
cause it was a condition precedent to legislative action. No indica-
tion was given as to the further legislative action contemplated.
In State v Billingham,3 the adjusting of salaries was also held to
be legislative and so subject to referendum because it involved ap-
propriations of money, but in Iowa it was held to be administra-
tive and so not subject to referendum.39
IV Some Methods of Attack Upon Ordinances
We are told that while certiorari lies to review certain acts of
councils it will not lie to review acts legislative in nature. This
rule consequently requires courts at times to distinguish between
legislative and non-legislative ordinances. In Lechlezdner v Car-
son,40 it was held that the discharge of a police officer was judicial,
not legislative and so was subject to review on certiorari. The
same may be said about the auditing of claims by the council
where a refund is demanded.41 Mandamus is not appropriate be-
cause its purpose is to coerce action rather than review it.
An ordinance granting a franchise, on the other hand, is legis-
lative and not reviewable by certiorar. 42 A petition for a declara-
tory judgment is appropriate to review the council's legislative
acts. A case involving an appointment to office and an attempted
reconsideration of it held that this problem was administrative,
but there is also authority that it is legislative.43
There are other cases where no discussion was had whether the
ordinances under attack were legislative or otherwise. Some ask
for a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of a license which
if issued would violate an ordinance; 44 in sodme there may be a
' See Munro, Recent Municipal Experiments in the U.S., 17 Jour. Soc. and
Comp. Legislation in the U.S., 82, 84 (1917). (No clear cut line between policy
makang and carrying out policy.)
' State v. Billingham, 183 Wash. 439, 48 P. 2d 602 (1935).
' Murphy v. Gilman, 204 Iowa 58, 214 N.W 679 (1927).
' Leckleidner v. Carson, 156 Ore. 636, 68 P. 2d 482 (1937).
'People ex rel. Hunter Arms Co. v. Foster, 288 N.Y.S. 295 (App. D. 1936)."-Tenny v. Columbia, 48 Wash. 150, 92 P 895 (1907). See 17 McQuMLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1950) sec. 49.69.
" De Woody v. Underwood, 34 N.E. 2d 263 (Ohio App. 1940). See
McQOu.LIN, ibid. sec. 49.83.
"Matter of Stubbe v. Adamson, 220 N. Y. 459, 116 N.E. 372 (1917). (License
to operate a garage in a zoned area demed); re McIntosh v. Johnson, 211 N. Y.
265, 105 N.E. 414 (1904).
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petition for a writ of habeas corpus when the plaintiff had been
arrested and held for trial for the violation of the sanitary code;
41
an injunction may be sought to prevent the enforcement of pro-
visions of a building code; 46 or there may be an action on a con-
tract which contract required the defendant to violate the building
code.47 The above-mentioned ordinances are probably to be re-
garded as legislative.
48
V Legislative Acts Subject To Veto
The issue whether certain acts of the common council are leg-
islative in nature or have a different character is sometimes tested
by the question whether they are subject to the mayor's veto.
It is asserted that the English common law doctrine that the
mayor is an integral part of the council has never prevailed in this
country,49 but such doctrines must of course yield to any conflict-
ing charter provisions. In Erwin v Jersey City, the plaintiff sued
for salary. He had been appointed corporation attorney. It was
held that the appointment was not a legislative act and so was not
subject to veto.50 A resolution accepting a bid for property offered
to be sold by the council was not legislative nor subject to vetori
in Pennsylvania, but the contrary is held in North Dakota, at least
where there is a resolution to repave certain streets and the ac-
ceptance of a bid for the performance of it.
5 2
' Knoblauch v. Warden, 216 N. Y. 154, 110 N.E. 451 (1915); People ex rel.
Lieberman v. Vandecarr, 75 N. Y. 440, 67 N.E. 913 (1903); People v. Griswold,
213 N. Y. 92, 106 N.E. 929 (1914). (Prosecution for violation of ordinance af-
fecting the practice of dentistry); People v. Charles Schwemler Press, 214 N. Y.
395, 108 N.E. 639 (1915).
'6 Grimmer v. Tenement House Dept., etc., 204 N. Y. 370, 97 N.E. 884 (1912).
' Hart v. City Theatres Co., 215 N. Y. 322, 109 N.E. 497 (1915).
"8See Mills v. Sweeney, 219 N. Y. 154, 110 N.E. 451 (1916) (Taxpayers suit
to restrain payment for publication of ordinances sustained); Mayor v. The Dry
Dock, etc. Co., 133 N. Y. 104, 30 N.E. 563 (1892) (Suit for penalty provided in an
ordinance which required defendant to run trains every twenty minutes (recovery
denied) which seem to be not legislative).
" Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411 (1876); Jackson v. Cosby, 179 Md. 671,
22 A. 2d 453 (1941).
' Erwin v. Jersey City, 60 N.J.L. 141, 37 A. 732 (1897). See Rich v. Me-
Launn, 83 Miss. 95, 35 So. 337 (1903). (The election of police judge is not sub-
ject to veto. It was noted above, also, that the sale of a bus franchise was not
subject to referendum as being legislative).
Straub v. Pittsburg, 138 Pa. 356, 22 A. 93 (1890).
State ex rel. Kettle River Quarries Co. v. Duis, 17 N. D. 319, 116 N.W 75
(1908). (The council by motion ratified a contract which had been earlier ap-
proved by the members individually, and the act was not regarded as the equivalent
of a resolution, subject to veto.)
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VI. Other Types of Council Activities
To define legislative acts and distinguish them from other
activities, whether of the congress or state legislatures or municipal
corporations in any brief, practical and systematic way would be a
very difficult if not impossible task. The various treatises and case-
books on legislation afford surprisingly little help. Courts have
occasionally indulged themselves in that pastime.
One of the more elaborate discussions about legislation and
attempts at definition of it as well as matters akin to it may be
found in Opinions of the Justices of New Hampshire.5 3 The court
there intimates that a legislative act is a law which provides a rule
permanent and uniform and universal and is not a sudden or
transient order. There is much learning in this opinion about
matters bordering on law and legislation and the interpretation
thereof. Other courts say that the proper test whether or not an
act is legislative is that a legislative act has general application and
does not amount merely to transient orders nor concern particular
persons.54 An ordinance, however, which exacts a license fee (for
the operation of vehicles in one s business) is legislative and so is
subject to referendum. 5 An ordinance that lays down a policy in
the operation of city government is legislative. The actual car-
rying out of the policy in the operation of city government is leg-
islative. The actual carrying out of the policy under another ordi-
nance is administrative.56
The extension of Municipal boundaries is legislative 57 as also
the setting apart of special tax districts for local improvements; 5s
as also the prohibition of the storage of gasoline in a named area5 9
and the abolishing of an office, but the dismissal of officers is ad-
- 66 N.H. 629, 33 A. 1076 (1891).
'Long v. Portland, 53 Or. 9, 98 P. 149, 151 (1909).
Erwim v. Jersey City, 60 N.J.L. 141, 37 A. 732 (1897), but see Straub v.
Pittsburg, 138 Pa. 356, 22 A. 93 (1890).
Monahan v. Funk, 137 Or. 580, 3 P 2d 778 (1931). (The mere determina-
tion of what property is to be purchased for a crematory site and the authorization
for the drawing of warrants for it is administrative.)
" Moore v. Yonkers, 235 Fed. 485 (C.C. App. N.Y. 1916); State ex rel. Hun-
zocker v. Pulliam, 168 Okla. 632, 37 P. 2d 417 (1934); Amencan Bunberg Corp.
v. Elizabethtown, 180 Tenn. 373, 175 S.W 2d 535 (1943); Houston v. State ex
rel. West Umversity Pl., 171 S.W 2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.) 142 Tex. 190, 176
S.W 2d 928 (1944).
' Londoner v. City & Co. of Denver, 52 Colo. 15, 119 P. 156 (1911).
' Larkin Co. v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926). (But mandamus
will lie to compel the issuance of a license when the ordinance is unreasonable).
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ministrative and so an opportunity to be heard is necessary.60 An
ordinance appropriating funds for baseball and hockey is not leg-
islative and the councilmen are personally liable therefor. 1
Some activities are thought of as judicial or quasi-judicial.
Thus, in Oklahoma Czty v Dolese,62 an ordinance forbidding the
storing of coal at a certain location as a nuisance was held to be
judicial and the owner was entitled to injunctive relief. The
Court of Appeals of Kentucky has illustrated non-legislative acts
such as the acceptance of bonds, the granting and revoking of li-
censes, the making of contracts for improvements and the accept-
ance of the completed work, suggesting that they are judicial or
administrative; 63 and the same has been held respecting the pur-
chase of property64 and the subscribing for railroad stock.65
Is a city or its council liable for their failure to perform legisla-
tive duties? In a number of cases litigants have believed that an
action would lie for such failures. Thus, where a city had express
authority to remove obstructions and widen and deepen a river
within its boundaries and failed to do so, the plaintiff deemed
that he could recover the damages he had suffered from the failure,
but it was held that he could not so recover; 66 nor is there liability
for failure to perform the duty of naming enough commissioners
in number to keep itself informed regarding the existence of defec
tive sidewalks; 67 nor for not deciding what streets should be im-
' Bremg v. County, 332 Pa. 265, 2 A. 2d 842 (1938).
1 Bums v. Esseling, 163 Minn. 57, 203 N.W 605 (1925).
' Oklahoma City v. Dolese, 48 Fed. 2d 734. See 17 McQtILLiN, MuNICnPAL
Co'oPRAToNs (3rd Ed. 1950) sec. 49.69.
'Reuter v. Meacham Contracting Co., 143 Ky. 537, 136 S.W 102 (1911).
The court might well have stopped here instead of proceeding with the assertion
that legislatures have no non-legislative powers. On that point see GAnNEa, POLI-
TICAL SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT (1935) p. 594. See Morganstern Elec. Co. v.
Coraopolis, 326 Pa. 154, 191 A. 603 (1937); Bremg v. County, 332 Pa. 265, 2 A.
2d 842 (1938). See also statement by Dean Fordham and Mr. Prendergast in 20
Cin. L. Rev. 313, 320 (1951), "It is worthy of note at this juncture that councils
of non-charter cities have legislative powers only; they may not perform any ad-
mnistrative duties whatever." Dean Fordham explains this statement in a letter
to the writer as being based on Sec. 4211 of the Ohio General Code and the quota-
tion is a paraphrase of the language of the statute. He recognized, however, the
difficulty of the assumption that "sharp lines can be drawn between what is legisla-
tive and what is admstrative for the purpose of devolution of authority to local
government bodies."
O Monahan v. Funk, 137 Or. 580, 3 P. 2d 778 (1931). (Not subject to refer-
endure); Morganstern Elec. Co. v. Coraopolis, 326 Pa. 154, 191 A. 603 (1937);
Brenig v. County, 332 Pa. 265, 2 A. 2d 842 (1938).
Cincinnati, etc., Ry. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77 (1852) (Delegable).
Goodrich v. Chicago, 20 Ill. 445 (1858).
0 7Dewry v. Detroit, 15 Mich. 306, 312 (1867).
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proved.68 In Detroit v Beckman,69 the original scheme for the con-
struction of certain public works was defectively planned and an
inadequate and carelessly drawn ordinance was enacted, but there
was no liability on the part of the city on that account. The failure
was attributable to the officers against whom the court said an
action may lie.
70
Legislative power is occasionally spoken of in an indefinable
manner, so that it is difficult to determine whether or not the term
is used comprehensively to include both law legislation and gov-
ernment legislation as Freund calls it, or simply law legislation.
Thus, it is within legislative power for a council to extend its
corporate limits. Is such an act legislative? 1 It indicates a policy
with respect to local affairs. Or the summoning of a witness with
subpoena duces tecum?72 Where the purpose is in aid of legisla-
tion it would surely be legislative. Or the choosing of the site for
an isolation hospital?73 Or the changing of the grades of streets?7 4
These two latter issues point toward administrative discretion. Or
the reconsideration of appointments when they have reached a cer
tam stage of completeness? 7  This seems to affect administration
rather than the determination of a policy
The motives which influence the legislative acts of councilmen
may not be inquired into. Presumably this is not true with respect
to acts not legislative. In Bzddeford v Yates,7 6 the council having
leased certain premises to a lessee for a period of years made a new
lease while the old one still had a period to run, which new lease
would take effect only after the terms of the present councilmen
"s Henderson v. Sandefur & Co., 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 550 (1875).
Detroit v. Beekman, 34 Mich. 125 (1876).
" Detroit v. Beckman, 84 Mich. 125 (1876); Lansing v. Toolan, 37 Mich.
152 (1887).
American Bunberg Corp. v. Elizabethtown, 180 Tenn. 378, 175 S.W 2d
535 (1943).
' La Guardia v. Smith, 288 N. Y. 1, 41 N.E. 2d 158 (1942).
" Jardine v. Pasadena, 199 Cal. 64, 248 P. 225, 48 A.L.R. 509 (1926).
"'Macy v. Indianapolis, 17 Ind. 267 (1861); Pontiac v. Carter, 32 Mich. 104
(1875).
'De Woody v. Underwood, 34 N.E. 2d 263 (Ohio App. 1940). See also
Pontiac v. Carter, 32 Mich. 104 (1875); 3 DrLLON, MUNICPAL ConPonAMONS
(5th Ed. 1911) sec. 1144.
" Biddeford v. Yates, 104 Me. 506, 72 A. 335 (1908). See also Gardiner v.
Bluffton, 173 Ind. 454, 89 N.E. 853, 90 N.E. 898 (1910) and Wood v. Seattle, 23
Wash. 1, 62 P 135 (1900); Kneier, Judicial Review of the Motives of City Councils
in 19 CEO. L. REv. 148 (1931); 5 McQumLLnr, M NicIPAL ConRoAwroNs (3rd
Ed. 1950) sees. 16.90, 16.91. The latter does not distinguish between legislative
and non-legislative acts m this regard.
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had expired. The plaintiff was not permitted to question their
motives. An ordinance, however, which detracts from the council's
future legislative power by the contract which the council pro-
poses to make, is invalid, and it seems appropriate for the court
to protect the city in such a matter whatever the motive may have
been. Thus, the council could not pass an ordinance permitting
a nearby city to erect a garbage disposal plant within its borders
in consideration of the release to it of a large debt owed to the
city, for that would affect its legislative power over the garbage
disposal plant area.
7
Finally, it may be observed that legislative acts tend to take the
form of ordinances, while resolutions tend toward being adminis-
trative and to work out the details in transitory matters.78
SUMMARY
There is no formula which can be relied upon persuasively to
identify legislative acts of councils and distinguish them clearly
from acts administrative. Even Professor Freund's suggestive classi-
fication into Law legislation and government legislation is difficult
to apply consistently in municipal matters. The only reason for
the attempt to describe and distinguish them is to promote the
conduct of the business of municipal government that it may pro-
ceed in an orderly manner. In those states where local referenda
are provided for by statute it would be highly confusing and im-
practical for all business to be obliged to await the outcome of a
popular vote. Thus, legislative matters as such which establish a
policy respecting public affairs alone should be so limited. Prob-
ably here we come most nearly to find a workable test. It is: Does
the act in question establish a policy for the business of govern-
ment? The writer believes that far too much stress is placed upon
the supposed distinction when the issue is one of delegation of
powers. Here there is no necessary general principle of no dele-
gation, but the matter calls for sound judgment applied to city
business. Some solution needs to be made in the case of appoint-
ments, salary adjustments and the matter of the mayor's veto, but
it should be empirical rather than logical.
'Schwab v. Graves, 223 N.Y.S. 160 (App. D. 1927). See note m 16 NAT.
MuN. REv. 794 (1927).
"See FoPDHsm, LocAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1949) p. 403; 5 McQuImLN,
MuNcnAL CoapomunoNs (1949) secs. 15.02; 15.08.
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The council cannot be made liable for failure to act because
such principle would alter the government of cities and would ap-
proach an attempt at direct individual control. The matter of
veto by the mayor must be subject to some limitations which
would be difficult to define by statute. In this embarrassment per-
haps it is necessary to limit the use of it to legislative matters. So
with reference to appointments and salary adjustments and the
matter of the veto the test will be as much an empirical one as it
will be of logical definition and distinction between that which is
legislative and that which is administrative.
